This paper analyzes optimal …nancial structure for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting for prospective asset mergers. Exercising a …rst-mover advantage, the incumbent increases his share of surplus by issuing long-term debt that appreciates in the event of merger. The incumbent also limits the prospective entrant's access to merger surplus with a covenant prohibiting assumption of additional long-term debt in the event of merger. If entry occurs, the entrant has high short-term cash obligations, but accomodates the incumbent covenant by issuing zero long-term debt. Incumbent leverage tightens …nancing constraints and reduces the likelihood of entry. However, high incumbent leverage has a counterveiling cost since the resulting debt overhang prevents ex post e¢ cient mergers when total managerial control bene…ts are high. The incumbent chooses high (low) long-term debt if total expected control bene…ts are low (high).
According to conventional wisdom, the deep pockets of an incumbent deter entry. In this view, potential entrants fear the incumbent will utilize …nancial slack to …nance predatory behavior, e.g. advertising targeted against rivals. A theoretical foundation for this view can be found in the model developed by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) which shows that a cash-rich incumbent can alter the shape of venture capital contracts and lower entrant returns using the threat of predation …nanced with internal funds.
Importantly, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) rule out the possibility of the incumbent acquiring the entrant's assets or vice-versa and specify asset values exogenously. In this paper, we consider optimal …nancial structures for an incumbent and potential entrant when there is an active secondary market for both …rm's assets. The asset "mergers" in our model approximate a wide range commonplace methods for unifying …rms'assets under a single umbrella, e.g. acquisitions, hostile takeovers, LBOs, trade-sales, and/or bankruptcy auctions. These markets are pervasive. For example, Gompers (1995) …nds that the majority of VC-backed projects end in either trade sales (38%) or bankruptcy auctions (25%). In both cases, an incumbent is a natural asset buyer. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that, "When …rms have trouble meeting debt payments and sell assets or are liquidated, the highest valuation potential buyers of these assets are likely to be other …rms in the industry."More generally, even those start-ups that go public have the potential to acquire or be acquired by more mature …rms within their industry.
In the model, the entrant and incumbent will evenly split the bilateral surplus coming from any asset merger, provided it is positive. Total merger surplus is equal to the increase in total cash ‡ow minus the loss in non-monetary control bene…ts for the owner/manager of the acquired …rm. The working assumption in the model is that merger is always ex post e¢ cient. This implies that a merger will always occur provided there are no third-party spillovers, such as those resulting from debt overhang. In order to deter entry, the incumbent would like to claim that it will never engage in asset mergers, since they boost entrant returns. However, such a claim is not credible (subgame perfect) if both …rms are unlevered.
To motivate this paper's results on optimal leverage and bond covenants, consider a bargaining game with equally strong parties (Leader and Follower) anticipating the division of a pie with eight slices worth a dollar each, with failure to reach agreement resulting in no pie for either. In this game, each party receives four slices. Next, modify the game by endowing one party, Leader, with the ability to move prior to bilateral bargaining with Follower, writing a third-party contract pledging one of the eight slices to a third-party, payable if and only if Leader and Follower subsequently reach agreement. When Leader and Follower bargain, they correctly compute the bilateral surplus from agreement as 7 (=8-1). Leader and Follower each receive 3.5 slices, but Leader also captures the one dollar value of the contract he sold to the third-party. In this way, the third-party contract increases Leader's share of total surplus.
Of course, if Follower could write an identical third-party contract, he would do so and both parties would again receive four dollars in total value. However, Leader would rationally anticipate this action on the part of Follower. He could block Follower's subsequent attempt at surplus extraction by including in his own third-party contract a clause prohibiting any bargaining with Follower if the latter has pledged any value to third-parties. In such a game, Leader again obtains a value of 4.5. 1 It is shown that long-term (public) debt can be used by …rms as a device for increasing their respective share of the total surplus created by asset mergers. As …rst-mover, the incumbent enjoys a strategic advantage. In particular, he can use his own debt to crowd out that of the entrant.
Further, the incumbent can attach an event risk covenant prohibiting merger with the entrant if the latter has any long-term debt. As second-mover, the entrant has no choice but to conform to the incumbent's covenant, and she takes on zero long-term debt.
Our model highlights the following tradeo¤ faced by the incumbent in choosing his debt level.
By choosing high debt, the incumbent extracts a larger share of total surplus in the event of an 1 Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) and Hennessy and Livdan (2008) have similar motivating examples in the context of …rm-worker bargaining. However, in their models only one party has the power to write a third-party contract ex ante, ruling out the strategic interactions that are central to our model. asset merger. In addition to the obvious direct bene…t conferred, this surplus extraction also deters entry. However, by taking on high debt the incumbent also risks preventing a merger if total merger surplus is low, as would be the case if managerial control bene…ts are high. Such an outcome is costly to the incumbent since he then faces product market competition.
To examine the interplay between incumbent and entrant …nancing policies, we consider a setting in which the owner-manager of the entrant has zero wealth and must raise entry costs from a venture capitalist. The venture capital contract is conditioned by incumbent …nancial structure, but the nature of the relationship is the opposite of the traditional view (e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990 ).
In our model, the cash ‡ows from the entrant production technology are privately observed by the owner-manager. The venture capital contract uses ownership rights as a carrot to induce the manager to deliver a portion of …rst-stage returns to the …nancier. In this setting, high debt of the incumbent tightens the …nancing constraint through two distinct channels. First, if the incentive contract calls for the manager to forfeit ownership, the venture capitalist receives a lower price in his asset sale (e.g. bankruptcy auction) if the incumbent has high debt. The second channel is more subtle. If the incumbent has high debt, the manager places a lower value on retaining ownershipsince there is less residual surplus for him to capture in the event of asset merger. Further, since the manager of the entrant is more likely to attach high value to asset control, an asset merger is less likely to generate positive bilateral surplus if the incumbent is heavily indebted. This souring of the carrot reduces managerial incentives and forces the venture capitalist to give stronger ownership rights to his manager. Both e¤ects reduce the venture capitalist's expected return, reducing the likelihood of entry.
Our model is most closely related to that developed by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) . Both models consider a self-…nanced incumbent (with a "long purse") facing the threat of entry by an entrepreneur reliant upon outside …nancing (in an optimal contracting environment with hidden cash ‡ows). The model of Bolton and Scharfstein o¤ers a rigorous foundation for the traditional argument in favor of incumbents maintaining a deep pocket. The di¤erence in conclusions between the two models stems from two critical di¤erences in underlying assumptions. First, Bolton and Scharfstein consider a setting where the only punishment available to the …nancier is to "liquidate" the project at an exogenous payo¤ of zero. Their second assumption, related to the …rst, is that the incumbent cannot acquire the entrant's assets or vice-versa. The assumptions of Bolton and Scharfstein are appropriate in settings where regulators prohibit all forms of asset acquisitions.
However, the empirical evidence cited above suggests that asset mergers are common, although their labeling varies. Further, in the U.S., regulators are often willing to waive antitrust objections for …rms in …nancial distress.
Central to the transmission mechanism in this paper is that the incumbent potentially in ‡uences secondary market values, even when he is the target rather than the acquirer. Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Povel and Raith (2004) generalize the model of Bolton and Scharfstein model to a continuous pro…t space. In their models, the liquidation payo¤ is positive, but exogenous. In our model, the entrant contract calls for rewards and punishments using ownership rights rather than liquidation threats. Regardless of who has ownership rights, they maximize the value they get from the assets and will engage in asset merger if there is positive bilateral surplus from doing so.
The model shares with Shleifer and Vishny (1992) a focus on the relationship between …nancial structure and secondary market prices. However, Shleifer and Vishny examine the interplay between …nancing decisions made by two …rms already in the industry. Our paper examines the interplay between the …nancial structures of an entrant and an incumbent. The model of Shleifer and Vishny contains a similar bene…t to maintaining deep pockets, in that low-debt …rms maintain the ability to purchase the assets of competitors. However, the cost of maintaining deep pockets di¤ers fundamentally. Shleifer and Vishny assume the …rm is managed (but not owned) by an empire-builder, implying that deep pockets exacerbate overinvestment. This argument is used to rationalize the use of debt. Zwiebel (1996) argues that, in the absence of a takeover threat, an empire-building manager would never take on debt. In contrast, we follow Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) in assuming the incumbent is self-…nanced. Thus, our model rationalizes the use of debt without relying upon manager-shareholder agency con ‡icts.
The paper is naturally related to the model of Myers (1977) since all e¤ects of leverage stem from externalities accruing to lenders. An important contribution of Myers'model is that it explains why growth …rms avoid debt. However, it fails to explain why …rms issue debt. In his model, optimal debt is zero, and strictly so for a …rm holding any growth options. In contrast, our model demonstrates two bene…ts of debt overhang: surplus extraction and entry deterrence. The latter bene…t is shown to be particularly large for value …rms. This novel explanation for the use of public debt is robust to Zwiebel's (1996) In their model, debt reduces incentives since the worker fears he will not be paid in the event of default. Our model is also related to that of Muller and Panunzi (2004) , who show that debt issuance can be used by a raider to overcome the free-rider problem in takeovers of widely-held …rms. In both models, debt helps to extract surplus. Our model abstracts from the free-rider problem by considering closely-held …rms. The …rst important di¤erence between the models is that we consider the entry-deterrence value provided by debt issuance. Second, we allow for strategic interaction in debt levels and …nancial contracts. Finally, our model highlights a key cost of high debt, the prevention of ex post e¢ cient asset mergers.
Our model is related to, but logically distinct from, existing papers arguing that debt serves as an entry deterrent. This literature is uniformly based on the premise that leverage encourages an incumbent to be more aggressive in quantity or price setting. As shown by Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) , limited liability causes equity to consider only non-default states in choosing its optimal strategy. This may encourage the levered …rm to choose a more aggressive policy than an unlevered …rm. McAndrews and Nakamura (1992) and Fulghieri and Nagarajan (1996) argue that such e¤ects make debt an entry deterrent. However, as discussed below, the e¤ect of debt on the …rm's pricing and output strategies is sensitive to the product market setup. Further, existing empirical evidence suggests that, if anything, levered …rms are less aggressive in setting prices and quantities.
First, Showalter (1995) shows the e¤ect of debt on quantity in a static Cournot game changes sign according to whether non-default states correspond to high demand or low costs. Faure-Grimaud (2000) and Povel and Raith (2004) show the e¤ect of debt in a static Cournot game is sensitive to whether absolute priority is obeyed in default. Di¤erent results are also obtained in multi-period models. Whereas in many dynamic models debt fosters competition (e.g. Maksimovic, 1988 ), in the model of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) , debt induces less aggressive behavior as the prospect of default reduces investments in market share. In a closely related paper, Dasgupta and Titman (1998) …nd that the e¤ect of leverage on behavior in product markets depends upon whether the …rm is a Stackelberg leader.
Second, theories predicting that leverage induces aggressive quantity or price setting are at odds with a large body of empirical evidence. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) …nd that supermarket chains that undertook leveraged buyouts cut prices less aggressively in downturns. Campello (2003) …nds that high leverage …rms tend to lose market share to low leverage …rms during downturns. Similar evidence is presented by Phillips (1994) , Chevalier (1995a Chevalier ( , 1995b , Zingales (1998) and Khanna and Tice (2005) .
The basic causal mechanism in our model is robust to these critiques. This is because the proposed theory of entry deterrence invokes a radically di¤erent transmission channel, namely, the levered incumbent uses debt to limit the entrant's access to the surplus generated by asset mergers.
In the interest of logical clarity, our model deliberately rules out any direct e¤ect of leverage on price or quantity decisions. Section 1 presents the basic model and Section 2 discusses various extensions. Section 3 discusses related empirical evidence.
The Model

Timing and Payo¤ s
The discount rate is zero and all agents are risk neutral. Throughout, capital letters denote the incumbent and lowercase letters denote the entrant. Upper bars denote expected values.
The incumbent …rm I is initially owned and operated by manager M: In order to abstract from the free-rider problem, there are no outside shareholders. We follow Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) in assuming the incumbent faces has in…nite outside wealth and faces no "…nancing constraints."In particular, the incumbent has already made whatever sunk investment was necessary to enter the market and has no debt outstanding initially. Further, the cash ‡ows generated by the incumbent's production technology are publicly observable.
There are two periods of potential product market competition taking place at times t 1 and t 2 : At time t 1 ; M has the ability to implement a publicly observed leveraged recapitalization.
Alternative timing assumptions regarding incumbent debt issuance are discussed in Section 2. In the recapitalization, all proceeds raised from the ‡otation of a zero coupon long-term bond will be distributed as a dividend. Long-term debt markets are perfectly competitive. The face value of incumbent debt is B, with payment due to creditor C at time t + 2 after second period product market competition. This maturity assumption is adopted without loss of generality since any short-term debt obligation of …rm I would have no e¤ect on …nal payo¤s. Creditor C has a senior claim to the second period cash ‡ow of …rm I: The only covenant in the bond is a prohibition on …rm I itself issuing any additional debt, in order to limit expropriation of C ex post. The bond contains no covenant restricting dividend payments out of I's cash ‡ows from period t 1 : Such a covenant would only serve to destroy value by undoing I's initial debt choice. Section 1 rules out covenants restricting mergers. The e¤ect and optimal form of such covenants is considered in Section 2. In the event of a merger, all outstanding debts will be placed on equal priority. In fact, this seniority assumption will be irrelevant once we allow the …rms to write covenants restricting mergers.
Following Hart (1991) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , long-term debts are public and not renegotiable. As argued by Smith and Warner (1979) , the strictures of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA) make it di¢ cult to renegotiate public debt. In particular, TIA requires bondholder unanimity in order to change any core term of an indenture. Aside from coordination issues, the unanimity requirement in TIA encourages lenders to free-ride, making renegotiation more di¢ cult. Consistent with these arguments, Gilson, John and Lang (1990) and Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) …nd that public debt is the single best predictor of failed private workouts. 
Since …rm e is the only potential entrant, the incumbent enjoys a monopoly in both periods if e does not enter at time t 0 . If e does enter, the incumbent will necessarily face product market competition in period t 1 with buyout prior to entry impossible. Intuitively, one can think of there being an in…nite number of entrepreneurs who can costlessly claim to have a viable competitor technology, with a single unknown entrepreneur being credible. In this setting, the incumbent cannot a¤ord to pay o¤ all potential competitors ex ante. Rather, he must wait until after t 1 to identify the bona …de competitor. If e enters, the incumbent does not necessarily face competition in period t 2 : This is because just prior to period t 2 , at time t 2 , the owners of …rms I and e have the option to merge. If there is a merger, the merged …rm cash ‡ow is m 2 .
Manager m has no wealth and must turn to a venture capitalist, vc, for funding. The vc holds all bargaining power in his negotiations with m: This assumption is without loss of generality since we are interested in identifying conditions under which the …nancier will be willing to fund entry.
The maximum funding possible is that which obtains when the …nancier has all bargaining power.
Further, it is natural to think that venture capitalists enjoy high bargaining power since their skills and capital are scarce relative to the number of entrepreneurs who fancy themselves as having a great business concept. The same bargaining power assumption is adopted by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , and for the same reasons, in their analysis of optimal entrant contracts.
The …nancial contract between the vc and m is written at time t 0 when the entry cost k is observed. The space of legally enforceable contracts consists of a reimbursement schedule r that m pays to vc from the …rst-stage (t 1 ) cash ‡ow and a reward probability , with both based upon a cash ‡ow report by m. The reward is the probability of m retaining ownership of the …rm at time t + 1 . The set of contracts is not limited to deterministic schemes: the fact that the reward is stochastic re ‡ects the fact that, at a theoretical level, deterministic schemes are dominated.
Further, randomization has an interesting economic interpretation, in that it approximates the type of deviations from absolute priority that are routinely observed in bankruptcies.
In addition to cash ‡ows, asset control generates non-monetary bene…ts accruing at time t 2 .
Manager M captures a nonstochastic control bene…t Y if he is a manager in period t 2 : The vc has a low nonstochastic control bene…t y = y l . Manager m captures a stochastic control bene…t y 2 fy l ; y h g if he is a manager in period t 2 : The probability of y h is 2 (0; 1): The realized value of y is …rst observed by m at time t 2 , after the …rst-stage pro…t report and just prior to any merger negotiation. In the merger negotiation at time t 2 , the realized value of y becomes common knowledge.
Control bene…ts satisfy
The existence of non-monetary control bene…ts creates a merger cost, since there will be only one asset manager post-merger. However, merger is always ex post e¢ cient under the maintained assumption A3 :
In contrast to earlier work on optimal entrant contracts, we derive endogenously the values that the …nancier and manager attach to ownership. Further, we allow the ultimate owner of the entrant's assets to issue long-term debt to a third-party. This debt is issued at time t 2 ; just after y is observed by m and just prior to the merger decision. The face value of …rm e's debt b is due at time t
The corresponding creditor is denoted c and there is no possibility for renegotiation.
Endowing the entrant owner with the ability to issue debt against second period cash ‡ow is important since it increases the share of merger surplus that can be extracted. This relaxes the entrant's …nancing constraint through two channels. First, vc is able to obtain a higher total payo¤ if he gains ownership. Second, m is more willing to deliver …rst-stage cash ‡ows to vc since she attaches greater value to her ownership rights.
Using appropriate stock conversion ratios, the bilateral surplus from any merger will be divided evenly between M and the entrant owner (vc or m). For example, a targeted …rm will receive more favorable exchange terms to compensate its manager for forfeiting control bene…ts. The division of surplus can be understood as arising from a repeated o¤ers bargaining game or from Nash's axiomatic formulation.
Under A3 merger would always occur if b = B = 0: To see this, suppose …rst y = y l : In this case, the incumbent would acquire the entrant with M serving as manager of the newly formed entity.
The bilateral merger surplus would be
If y = y h , the the bilateral surplus from merger is lower since a larger control bene…t is sacri…ced.
In this case, the entrant would acquire the incumbent with m serving as manager. The bilateral surplus would be
Y > 0:
Debt Overhang and the Viability of Mergers
The model is solved by backward induction. We begin by analyzing the merger decision accounting for any long-term debt obligations. Recalling that the merged entity assumes the debt obligations of …rms I and e; the market value of the debt of the monopolist, evaluated at time t 2 ; would be
If the merger did not occur, the debt obligation of …rm I would have market value equal to
If the merger did not occur, the debt obligation of …rm e would be worth zero since the managerowner of e would always report that the second-stage cash ‡ows from the duopoly was zero.
Consider now the merger decision if the entrant's owner has low control bene…ts. In this case, it would be optimal to let M serve as manager and the bilateral surplus from merger would be
The preceding equation shows that long-term debts threaten the merger via two channels, with both related to positive externalities that a merger would confer upon creditors C and c. 
under the post-merger monopoly.
Consider next the merger decision if the entrant's owner has high control bene…ts. In this case it would be optimal to let m serve as manager and the bilateral surplus from merger would be
Again, we see that debt overhang from outstanding long-term debts threatens the merger, with the problem being more acute if y = y h since total merger surplus is lower.
It is convenient to de…ne a (relatively) high level of incumbent debt such that there would be exactly zero bilateral surplus from merger even if b = 0 and y = y l : To this end, let B H 2 (0; 1)
denote the unique solution to
Note that if the incumbent chooses B H a merger will occur if and only if b = 0 and y = y l : This foreshadows the key cost of high debt, preventing mergers when there are high control bene…ts.
Next de…ne a (relatively) low level of incumbent debt such that there would be exactly zero bilateral surplus from merger if b = 0 and y = y h : Let B L 2 (0; B H ) denote the unique solution to
Note that if y = y l and the incumbent were to choose B L while the entrant chose b = 0, there would be strictly positive bilateral surplus from merger with
The preceding equation foreshadows the key cost of low debt in our model. By taking on low debt the incumbent leaves "residual surplus", a portion of which can be captured by the entrant. In addition to increasing the premium that must be paid to the entrant, this e¤ect also encourages entry.
Optimal Long-Term Debt for Entrant
Let b l (B) and b h (B) denote the optimal long-term debt commitment of the entrant conditional upon incumbent debt when control bene…ts are low and high, respectively. We begin …rst by characterizing the optimal entrant reaction function under y l : For all B > B H ; b l (B) = 0 since in this case merger surplus is negative. Here the entrant's owner will simply receive his reservation value of 2 +y l : Consider next an arbitrary B 2 (0; B H ): For any b su¢ ciently low such that bilateral surplus is positive, the value of the claim held by the entrant's owner, denoted , is equal to the sum of the value of his debt ‡otation plus his reservation value plus one-half the bilateral surplus from merger:
This function is strictly increasing in its …rst argument on the interval under consideration, with
It follows that for all B B H the optimal entrant long-term debt is b l (B) = b crit l (B) where the latter is the unique solution to the equation
Under this reaction function, when the incumbent chooses the low debt B L and control bene…ts are y l , the entrant achieves a payo¤ equal to
When the incumbent chooses B L and control bene…ts are y l , the entrant achieves a value equal to his reservation value plus one-half the residual surplus left free by the incumbent plus an additional amount stemming from his strategic issuance of long-term debt.
Consider
Di¤erentiating e we …nd that this function is strictly increasing in b on the interval under consideration since e 1 = 1 : It follows that for all B B L the optimal entrant long-term debt is
where the latter is the unique solution to the equation
The following lemma summarizes the results of this subsection.
Lemma 1.
If entrant control bene…ts are low (high) and the face value of incumbent debt is strictly less than B H (B L ); the entrant optimally issues su¢ cient long-term debt to drive bilateral merger surplus down to zero.
From Lemma 1 it follows that the optimal incumbent debt is
In lieu of a formal proof, we here sketch the argument. Since the long-term debt is fairly priced, the total value received by M if there is no merger is simply …rm I's total cash ‡ow plus the control bene…t Y . If there is a merger, the incumbent receives total …rm value including the control bene…t maxfy; Y g less the value captured by the entrant. Therefore, a particular …nancial structure In order to derive the optimal contract it is necessary to compute the expected value m and vc attach to winning ownership of …rm e; with the expectation taken at date t 0 : Before doing so we recall that ownership of …rm e is decided at time t + 1 ; after the …rst period cash ‡ow report and before y is observed. The manager's valuation is denoted x and the venture capitalist's valuation is denoted p; with subscripts indexing the incumbent's debt.
Under B = B H there is no merger if y = y h ; with merger negotiations pinning the entrant owner to the reservation value of 2 + y l if y l is realized. Therefore, here the expected value to m from winning ownership of …rm e is his expected reservation value
Similarly, if B = B H the vc values ownership rights at his reservation value
Under B = B L merger always occurs. If y = y h merger negotiations pin m to her reservation value of 2 + y h : If y l is realized, the entrant will capture the value given by equation (12) . It follows that
Having determined the ex ante value of ownership rights, we can express the optimal contract in terms of the pair (p; x): Before doing so we adopt a …nal technical assumption that greatly simpli…es the algebra involved without altering anything of economic substance.
The optimal contract maximizes the gross return to vc which consists of …rst-stage cash reim- 
This condition is satis…ed with equality at all points on the state space when r 0 = x 0 :
The IC condition is informative about the trade-o¤s facing the …nancier in choosing : By increasing marginally, the value of the …nancier's ownership rights fall by p 0 : However, there is a larger compensating gain since m is willing to increase the reimbursement by x 0 .
The optimal contract solves
Lemma 2 characterizes the optimal contract.
Lemma 2. The optimal venture capital contract is
The gross return to the venture capitalist under the optimal contract is
Proof: See appendix.
Lemma 2 indicates that the optimal venture capital contract calls for vc to receive all …rst-stage cash ‡ows, with m being encouraged to deliver higher cash ‡ows using the promise of increased ownership rights. The gross return to vc is then simply the expected …rst-stage cash ‡ow plus the expected value of his ownership claim. Since entry only occurs if k v ; it follows that the incumbent increases the probability of entry by choosing B L rather than B H : To see this note that
It is interesting to note that the adoption of B L relaxes the entrant's …nancing constraint through two channels. First, the venture capitalist's return is directly increased by the fact that he places higher value on ownership rights with p L > p H : Second, the incentive compatibility condition is relaxed, with the manager being more willing to deliver …rst-stage project returns in exchange for increased ownership rights since x L > x H :
Optimal Long-Term Debt for Incumbent
Having determined the optimal response of the entrant to the leverage chosen by the incumbent, there is zero residual surplus from merger and the entrant is pinned to the reservation value of 2 + y h : When y = y l ; there is residual merger surplus, and the entrant captures the amount derived in equation (12) . Therefore,
Suppose next that B H is chosen. Then entry only occurs with probability
there is entry, the incumbent receives the duopoly cash ‡ow in the …rst period. Post-entry, the incumbent and entrant merge i¤ y = y l : In such a merger, there is zero residual surplus and the entrant is pinned to the reservation value 2 + y l : Therefore,
A bit of algebra yields Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The optimal long-term debt for the incumbent is
and B L > 0 if not.
Corollary. The attractiveness of high debt increases in short-term monopoly rents and decreases in long-term monopoly rents. If the probability of high control bene…ts is su¢ ciently low, then B H is optimal.
The intuition for Proposition 1 and its corollary are as follows. E¤ectively, the proposition states that high debt is optimal when the entry deterrence e¤ect, captured by the left side of equation (27), is su¢ ciently strong. The …rst bracketed terms in the numerator and dominator of the right side of the equation capture the likelihood that entry will be deterred and that the monopoly pro…t will be captured in the …rst period. Since Z(v H ) < Z(v L ); the …rst-stage monopoly rent is more valuable if the incumbent has high debt. Thus, a testable implication of the model is that value …rms should have higher leverage. The middle terms in the numerator and denominator measure the expected premium that must be paid to the entrant in the event that low control bene…ts are realized and the entrant is acquired. These terms capture the second bene…t of high debt, potential reductions in acquisition premia. The last bracketed terms capture the cost of high debt, the loss of second-stage monopoly rents if high debt overhang prevents a merger from taking place when control bene…ts are high. Thus, another testable implication of the model is that growth …rms should eschew long-term debt. Further, the model predicts that leverage should be decreasing in total expected control bene…ts.
Model Extensions
This section considers various extensions of the model and alternative assumptions.
Covenants Restricting Mergers and Acquisitions
Bond covenants routinely place various restrictions on …rms' ability to engage in mergers and acquisitions. Typically, such covenants are justi…ed as devices for mitigating agency problems, e.g.
potential risk shifting associated with a risky acquisition. Here we show that such covenants can play an important role in determining the division of surplus in asset sales. We consider the following simple covenant. The incumbent can include in his debt a covenant prohibiting a merger if entrant debt exceeds b max : Similarly, the entrant can include in her debt a covenant prohibiting a merger if incumbent debt exceeds B max :
What is the equilibrium of the resulting Stackelberg game in bond covenants? Using backward induction we …rst analyze the optimal entrant covenant. If a merger occurs, the entrant cannot receive less than the value of her outside option, which is 2 + y: Therefore, as the follower, the entrant will simply "accommodate" the debt chosen by the incumbent by failing to write any such covenant or by stipulating B max greater than the B actually chosen by the incumbent. Returning to equation (12) we see that measures the extra surplus the entrant is able to capture when she issues debt against residual surplus left free by the incumbent. An optimal incumbent covenant fully limits the entrant's ability to issue debt against the surplus generated by the merger.
The following proposition summarizes the results. with set equal to zero.
Note that a covenant setting a limit on the assumption of debt only serves to increase V L : This is because choosing B L leaves the incumbent vulnerable to surplus extraction by the entrant as the latter dilutes the value of incumbent debt. The bond covenant prevents this activity and makes low debt relatively more attractive.
Proposition 2 provides a number of strong testable implications. First, incumbent …rms should have high long-term debt, while entrants should have low long-term debt. Second, incumbent …rms should write tight debt covenants, while entrants should write covenant-lite loans, at least with respect to limitations on mergers.
Delaying Incumbent Debt Issuance until after the Entry Decision
In the model presented in Section 1, the incumbent could only issue debt at date t 1 : This assumption can be rationalized by lags in the ‡otation of public debt as the …rm goes through the underwriting process with an investment bank and complies with SEC disclosure requirements.
However, this timing assumption can be relaxed somewhat without changing the results stated above. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 remain valid if the incumbent must choose its debt before knowing the realized control bene…t y and before knowing the outcome of the control contest between the entrant manager and the venture capitalist.
To …x ideas, we consider the general setting of the preceding subsection, where restrictions on the assumption of counterparty debt are feasible. Now suppose that the incumbent has the option to issue date at date t 1 or to delay the debt ‡otation until after observing the entry decision of …rm e: Let us then consider pairs of potentially optimal debt policies, undertaken at date t 1 or date t 1 : Such pairs are denoted (B (t 1 ); B (t 1 )): Since the …rm delaying debt issuance until date t 1 necessarily ignores the entry-deterrence bene…t of high debt, such a …rm issues weakly lower debt. 2 Therefore, we know
If (B H ; B H ) or (B L ; B L ) are optimal, the incumbent is indi¤erent between issuing debt at date t 1 or date t 1 : However, if the pair (B H ; B L ) is optimal, then it is optimal to issue debt with face value B H at time t 1 : The reasoning is as follows. If (B H ; B L ) are optimal ex ante and ex post, respectively, we know V H > V L : Issuing debt with face value of B H at date t 1 allows the incumbent to attain V H : However, if the incumbent delays issuance of debt until date t 1 ; the entrant will rationally infer that the incumbent will choose B L at that time. In this case, the ex ante value of the incumbent's claim is V L < V H : We have established the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For the incumbent, issuing debt at date t 1 weakly dominates issuing debt at date t 1 :
Conditioning Incumbent Debt on Entrant Control
In reality, control rights are not binary. Further, the exact date of the settlement of control contests is often unclear. Therefore it may be appropriate to assume, as we have up until this point, that the incumbent does not have the ability to condition his debt upon entrant control at date t If debt is issued at date t 1 ; Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal debt policy. Next, consider the optimal debt policy if the incumbent delays debt issuance until t + 1 : If vc wins control, the incumbent knows control bene…ts are y l : Given this knowledge, B H is optimal since the merger will occur with probability one, with the acquisition price equal to the minimum possible, 2 + y l :
Suppose next that the manager wins control. If B L is chosen, the merger occurs regardless of the realized control bene…t. However, the manager will capture half the residual surplus left by the incumbent in the event that realized control bene…ts are low. Conversely, if B H is chosen, no merger will occur if control bene…ts are high. Face value B L is an optimal response to managerial control if it yields higher expected …rm value net of entrant payo¤s. Thus, B L is an optimal response to manager control i¤:
Rearranging terms in the preceding equation it follows that B L is an ex post optimal response to manager control i¤:
If b , the incumbent is primarily concerned with the extraction of surplus from mergers in which the manager has low control bene…ts. Therefore, for low values of , B H is always optimal at time t
In such cases, V w = V H and one may assume without loss of generality that the incumbent returns to choosing between B H and B L at date t 1 : In such cases, the optimal debt policy continues to be that described in Proposition 2.
Consider next > b . Here the incumbent would adopt a state-contingent debt policy if it were to delay its debt issuance until date t + 1 ; choosing B H in response to venture capitalist control and B L in response to managerial control. In this case it is clear that V w > V L . This is because both policies ensure that mergers occur with probability one. However, setting B L at time t 1 allows the entrant to capture a higher payo¤ under vc control. Therefore, to determine the optimal policy we may con…ne attention to a comparison of V H and V w :
We turn next to computing V w for > b . If vc has control B = B H ; implying
If m has control B = B L ; implying
It follows that
Since v H < v w it follows that delaying debt issuance has a cost in that it induces a higher probability of entry than under an ex ante commitment to B H : There is a countervailing bene…t from delayed debt issuance, however, since it ensures that mergers occur with probability one. Computing V w as total …rm value net of entrant payo¤s, one obtains
This analysis leads to Proposition 3. 
then the optimal policy for the incumbent is to delay debt issuance until date t Finally, we close our analysis of the optimal timing of incumbent debt issuance by considering the optimal incumbent strategy if he can issue debt after observing the control bene…t y but before any negotiation regarding merger terms. In this case, the incumbent should issue at time t 1 an arbitrarily small tranche of long-term debt maturing at date t + 2 with a tight covenant prohibiting merger with …rms having any long-term debt. In this way, the incumbent would prevent the entrant from extracting any merger surplus. However, the initial debt ‡otation should allow the incumbent to freely issue his own debt at the future date when y will be observed. The incumbent could then ensure that mergers occur with probability one, while extracting all merger surplus, by issuing new debt such that the total face value of debt is B L if y h is observed and B H if y l is observed.
Empirical Implications
The main argument in this paper is that the leverage and covenants of an incumbent increase its share of total surplus arising from various forms of asset mergers. In addition to this direct bene…t, high incumbent debt is also predicted to limit the debt capacity of potential competitors by driving down the value of their underlying assets. Our model also delivers speci…c predictions regarding debt maturity and covenant structures. Mature …rms are predicted to have high long-term debt and to write covenants limiting merger activity. Young entrants are predicted to have low long-term debt and to write loose covenants in terms of merger restrictions.
The …rst testable implication of the model is that deep-pocketed …rms will pay more for acquisi- A third testable implication of the model is that a …rm's cost of debt capital will be increasing in the leverage of other …rms. By way of contrast, the conventional wisdom regarding the value of deep pockets would predict the exact opposite. Consistent with our model, Newman and Rierson (2004) examine spillovers in European telecom bond markets. They …nd that a new bond ‡otation by a given telecom …rm generally has a statistically and economically signi…cant positive e¤ect on the yield spread on the debt of other borrowers. This is consistent with the causal mechanism in our model, which relies upon the notion that incumbent debt has an adverse e¤ect on the ability of entrants to get …nancing.
Consider next the evidence on …rms'choice of debt levels and debt composition. Consistent with our model, Barclay and Smith (1995) document that larger mature …rms rely more heavily upon long-term debt. Houston and James (1996) and Faulkender and Petersen (2006) document that older …rms have higher leverage ratios and are more likely to use public debt as opposed to bank or privately placed debt. This is consistent with our argument that public debt can be used as a commitment device for …rms seeking to protect economic rents.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that value …rms choose higher debt levels than growth …rms.
Such evidence is typically interpreted as being supportive of the theory of Myers (1977) , who argues that growth …rms want to avoid debt. Our model generates a similar prediction, with Corollary 1 stating that high leverage is less attractive when the long-term monopoly rent is important.
However, Myers'theory fails to explain why value …rms take on debt. In his framework, the optimal debt for all …rms is zero. By way of contrast, our model provides a rationale for the use of public debt by value …rms, with Proposition 1 predicting that value …rms will take on debt in order to protect short-term rents.
Consistent with our theory, MacKay and Phillips (2005) …nd that leverage ratios are higher in concentrated industries. In addition, they …nd that pro…tability and (high) leverage for incumbent …rms are both highly persistent. This is consistent with our argument that the high debt burdens of incumbents serve to alleviate the competitive pressures that would otherwise dissipate economic rents.
The most important untested implications of our theory concern the structure of bond covenants.
The theory o¤ered here suggests that mature …rms should write tight covenants limiting the assumption of debt in mergers, with younger …rms writing loose covenants. A recent survey documents that change of control covenants were attached to more than half of European public debt issues. 3 However, there is no direct evidence relating event risk covenants to …rm characteristics. Consistent with our theory, change of control covenants do appear to generate a positive spillover to lenders in the event of merger. Billett, Jiang, and Lie (2008) document that bondholders without covenant protection experience a negative abnormal return in LBOs while those with protection experience positive abnormal returns.
Bae, Klein and Padmaraj (1994) …nd that the inclusion of event risk covenants in a bond ‡otation has a positive e¤ect on the abnormal return to shareholders, consistent with our model. However, the evidence on this issue is mixed. An alternative hypothesis is that event risk covenants are used as a device for increasing managerial entrenchment, to the detriment of shareholders. Consistent with that hypothesis, Norton and Pettengill (1998) document that event risk covenants have a negative e¤ect on shareholder returns. Further testing of this hypothesis, linked to variables measuring the quality of corporate governance would be helpful in clarifying the con ‡icting empirical evidence.
Conclusion
There is no denying the value conferred upon an incumbent with deep pockets. In this paper, we showed that maintaining deep pockets has a countervailing cost. When facing a deep-pocketed incumbent, a potential entrant knows that the incumbent has the incentive to engage in value enhancing asset mergers ex post. In some cases, this positive e¤ect on exit values may be su¢ cient to tilt the balance in favor of entry. The existence of such an e¤ect was illustrated using a simple contracting model with endogenous price determination in secondary asset merger markets. Zero debt is never optimal for the incumbent. Rather, he should at least create a minimal level of debt overhang so that all bilateral merger surplus is exhausted when total surplus is low. By taking on even higher levels of debt, the incumbent increases his ability to extract additional surplus when the latter is high. However, this comes at the cost of an increased probability of failed merger if total surplus is low. Finally, in terms of incumbent …nancial structure, it was shown that event risk covenants, such as poison puts for bondholders, can be value increasing for incumbent shareholders since they limit entrants'ability to access merger surplus.
It was also shown that a …nancially in ‡exible incumbent will have a signi…cant e¤ect on the shape of venture capital contracts. In particular, the debt and/or covenants of an incumbent prevent entrants from utilizing long-term debt …nancing and limit overall debt capacity. This e¤ect operates through two distinct channels. First, shallow incumbent pockets reduce the value …nanciers receive in the event of asset sales. Second, shallow incumbent pockets reduce the value the entrant manager places on retaining ownership. This weakens the power of feasible incentives.
The more general message delivered by the model is that the overhang problem, …rst discussed by Myers (1977) , is not isolated to the particular …rm operating under a high debt burden. Rather, the high debt of an incumbent will tend to discourage entry and entrepreneurial activity in its sector. This is because the sell price of capital, typically treated as an exogenous parameter in investment models, is an endogenous variable that is decreasing in the leverage of existing …rms. Our model shows that such overhang may confer a bene…t to incumbents, allowing them to capture economic rents. However, such strategic behavior is clearly detrimental to product market competition, economic e¢ ciency, and innovation. The optimality condition is
The multiplier conditions are 
The transversality condition for this problem is (0) = 0: Next note since x > p it follows that ( ) < 1 ) r( ) = under the optimal program.
